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Monday, June 6, 2011

How low can you go? A model for setting and increasing a carbon price



Climate_committee_aap
A carbon price won’t help much unless it keeps going up. AAP
To achieve actual reductions in Australia’s emissions, the carbon price will need to rise from its likely starting point in the $20s. A price floor in the trading phase could help bring about efficient low-carbon investments, by keeping policy related uncertainty in check.
It is no surprise the bookies have the range of $20-25 per tonne of carbon dioxide as the odds-on favourite for the starting price of Australia’s carbon pricing scheme. Ross Garnaut recommended $20-30 and singled out $26 for special mention; the Business Council’s call for a $10 price is counterbalanced by the Greens’ stated preference for something like $40; and Climate Change Minister Combet said it would be “well south of $40”.

What goes up – might keep going up

Will this price get us a reduction of 5% or more in Australia’s domestic emissions, in line with the national target?
First of all, it is important to understand that investment decisions that will shape the emissions trajectory depend on price expectations over the medium term, not on the starting price.
As I argued in this paper, the beauty of the fixed price approach is that it allows us to start with a low price that keeps the economic transition manageable, and ramp up thereafter to levels needed for investments that actually cut emissions.
Treasury modelling done for the CPRS scheme indicates that a 2020 carbon price in the range of $50 to $60 (in today’s prices) would be needed to achieve a reduction in emissions, relative to year 2000 levels.
A scenario with a price in the $40s had emissions stabilising rather than falling.
The modelling is being updated, and other analyses give different results. But the best guess is that prices in the $20s or 30s would see emissions keep going up.
This is because the underlying emissions growth trend is so strong. The government’s projection of business-as-usual emissions has our domestic emissions rising by 24% from 2000 to 2020 without further policies. This was revised up from the previous estimate because of faster resources and mining industry growth.

What to do?

We could hope that the response to the carbon price will be stronger than thought, as has been the case in many other market-based schemes to cut pollution. But there are of course no guarantees of that, and it could go the other way.
We could rely on carbon offsets from land-based sequestration. But as government analysis shows, the amounts of emissions reductions actually achievable might be small. The Climate Commission argues that carbon sequestration is no long-term substitute for avoiding fossil fuel emissions.
We could buy additional emissions reductions from overseas.
This is almost certainly going to be necessary for more ambitious targets than the 5% reduction, and it would be a useful contribution to the global effort by supporting investments and emissions reductions in developing countries. But it would be quite unpalatable to for many groups to see actual domestic emissions levels continue to rise, and it would raise questions about the extent of change at home.

Stepping it up

Two options could help square the circle.
Firstly, the fixed price could be legislated to rise at sizeable increments from the start – say, rising by $4-5 each year.
There is no economic or administrative hurdle to a steady scheduled increase. The money available for assisting households and industry increases in line with the carbon price. And a fast rising fixed price would create an incentive for business to support the transition to an emissions trading scheme.
The practical hurdle here is a potential political reluctance to embark on a trajectory that will result in substantial change in the way things are done, particularly in the energy sector.

Installing a price floor

Secondly, government would do well to firm up price expectations for the trading phase, slated to follow the fixed price scheme after a few years. As I have argued in a recent briefing for the Multi-Party Climate Change Committee, and in a research paper with Steve Hatfield-Dodds of CSIRO, a price floor (or minimum price) could encourage cost-effective investments in low-carbon assets, by reducing policy-generated price risk.
Providing a price floor would be the best way to deal with the possibility that international emissions markets might be fragmented, while they mature. For example, the European Union excludes certain types of international emissions offsets from the EU emissions trading scheme, and may shun offsets from anywhere but least developed countries. This could leave large amounts of credits from developing countries going cheap.
Where the emissions reductions are real, it is fine to use them towards our national target. But letting them set a low domestic price could delay investments that are efficient in the long run.
A price floor solves the problem: it allows the use of low-cost international emissions units, while maintaining a minimum price in the Australian market.
A price floor in operation could increase the short run cost of Australia achieving a given 2020 emissions target, but it could reduce economic costs over the medium to long term. Making provisions for a price floor would lower investment risk whether or not it is ever triggered.
Implementation could be through a reserve price on domestically auctioned permits, coupled with a fee on the conversion of international permits for use in the domestic ETS. It is administrative simple, and avoids arbitrary interventions in carbon markets.
A price floor is also provides a more direct and effective way to ensure that Australia’s domestic emissions fall than the alternative of putting a potentially arbitrary additional cap on the use of international permits. And , and it does this in a way that reduces rather than increases business risks.

The right start

Pulling together a compromise for a carbon price is no mean feat for a minority government and in a political climate where reasoned argument finds little room.
A fixed price on carbon is a good start toward sensible and effective climate policy. But ambition needs to rise, and it can.
Australia is riding an unprecedented resources boom. To think that we could not afford to modernise our economy to be more carbon efficient would be a narrow perspective indeed.

Why Australia needs a carbon bank



Reserve_bank_aap
Good governance makes for boring pictures, but trustworthy carbon pricing. AAP
The World Bank ranks Australia among the top five countries in the world in terms of its regulatory environment. Australia also ranks in the top ten countries in terms of control of corruption.
International rankings can be fickle things. But when it comes to these measures of institutional quality, there is little doubt that it is better to be nearer the top of the rankings than the bottom.
Australia has generally been served well by our key regulatory and governance institutions.
The current balance of Australian politics suggests that we will see a carbon price legislated during 2011.
Given that we have bilateral support for emissions reductions, a move to price carbon would be a win for good economic governance. But the carbon governance challenge does not end with the establishment of a carbon price.

Market credibility

A market for greenhouse gases is an unnatural market, the functioning of which relies on the quality of the market’s administration.
Following the transition to a floating price, the value of emissions permits will depend strongly on the credibility of the market regulator’s commitment to limit emissions to the capped level.
A poorly-managed carbon market would open up many opportunities for shonks and shysters.
As recent experiences in Europe have shown, fraud tends to occur in difficult-to-predict ways. The future regulator of the Australian carbon market will need to be on its toes.
Rorting is a particularly important risk when it comes to links between any Australian scheme and carbon credits generated in countries with weak governance.
As he did in 2008, Professor Garnaut has recommended the establishment of a carbon bank to manage the emissions trading scheme, and to administer assistance to emissions-intensive, trade-exposed industries.
The role of the recommended carbon bank is similar to the role of the regulator of the dead-in-the-water Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme.
As with other regulatory agencies, a key advantage of the idea is that it keeps the politicians at arm’s length from the day-to-day running of markets.

Other models

Garnaut is not the first to call for a carbon bank.
Professor Warwick McKibbin of the Australian National University has been recommending a carbon pricing system with a strong carbon bank for years.
McKibbin’s hybrid model includes a carbon bank that has the ability to set the short-term price of carbon, in much the same way as the Reserve Bank of Australia sets short-term interest rates.
McKibbin’s model has many merits. But it appears that for the moment the horse has bolted in favour of a conventional emissions trading scheme (with the government setting the price for the first years) and a more limited carbon bank with mainly regulatory and market facilitation functions.

Independent advice

Carbon pricing will generate big bucks. The past few years have seen a large amount of lobbying by those who want a share of this revenue.
An additional suggestion in the latest Garnaut Review is that of providing a role for the Productivity Commission (or another independent agency) to make recommendations on industry assistance.
The Australian public would benefit substantially from having an assistance regime that is based on principled economics rather than political calculations. So the idea of seeking the ongoing advice of an independent agency on assistance measures is a good one.
Garnaut also recommends that an independent committee be established to provide advice on emissions reduction targets and other matters, an idea modelled on the United Kingdom Committee on Climate Change.
High-quality independent advice is a good thing. But ultimately the big decisions will be made by the parliament.
Making sure that politicians and the public are better informed about climate science and economics is perhaps the most important prerequisite for sound long-term climate policy.

Institutions are key

The carbon bank, or whatever it ends up being called, will need to strive to protect Australia’s image of strong institutions.
It will be the most important facilitator of Australia’s climate change mitigation efforts. Its stewardship will also be important for the health of Australia’s financial system more broadly.
Without confidence in the regulatory regime underpinning the carbon market, emissions trading would be untenable.
This would be a significant setback to our efforts to mitigate climate change risks.

Monday’s medical myth: men also go through menopause





Men’s testosterone decline isn’t quite the same as menopause. Andres Thor

Feeling tired and grumpy? Maybe a litte emotional? If you’re a middle-aged male, these symptoms might be hormone-related, but no, you’re not going through man opause.
It’s true that signs of men’s low testosterone are similar to symptoms of menopause: low energy, mood swings, irritability, poor concentration, reduced muscle strength and bone density, and a lack of interest in sex.
But unlike women, whose oestrogen levels fall rapidly when they go through menopause, men’s testosterone declines much more modestly and gradually.
Testosterone levels in men are highest between the ages of 20 and 30 years, and from from 30 to 80 years they drop by around a third. Some men will experience a greater drop than others, particularly if they’re overweight or obese.
Testosterone is essential for good health because it stimulates the growth of muscles, bones, and the bone marrow that makes red blood cells.
So testosterone or “androgen” deficiency – which affects one in 200 Australian men under 60 – can have a major effect on the body’s ability to function normally.
The “manopause” myth has been perpetuated by the interest in testosterone replacement therapy (TRT) as an elixir of youth to improve the symptoms and signs of ageing.
Testosterone therapy offers benefits for men with known causes of androgen deficiency, but there is a lack of data to define the level of deficiency that warrants this treatment.
If the cause of androgen deficiency is unknown, treatment needs to be tailored to the individual. Testosterone treatment certainly shouldn’t be requested or prescribed in the belief that it’s a “cure-all” for symptoms of ageing.
For ageing men without classic androgen deficiency the jury is still out on the effectiveness of testosterone replacement therapy.
The safety of the treatment – particularly on the prostate and cardiovascular system – is unclear, and the benefits seem relatively modest. There is certainly no remarkable return to youthful vigour.
Often, low testosterone levels can be a sign of underlying health conditions. Low testosterone levels are associated with various chronic diseases such as diabetes, heart disease and depression.
The Massachusetts Male Ageing Study (the largest study of male ageing) found that chronic illness, use of prescription medication, obesity or excessive alcohol intake were associated with a 10 to 15 per cent reduction in serum testosterone levels (testosterone in the blood) in men aged over 40 years.
Treatment, then, should focus reducing the risk factors for these conditions (i.e. weight loss, reduced alcohol intake) rather than the testosterone level.
While the idea that men, too, go through menopause might be a playful explanation of the ageing process, it shouldn’t be taken too seriously, especially if serious symptoms of chronic diseases are dismissed.

Illam katru-Pithamaghan-Illayaraja